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According to people’s folk theory of behavior, intentions are mental states directed
towards future action whereas intentionality is a specific manner in which a behavior
is performed, namely, with an intention and with skill and awareness. The present
studies explore the implications of this distinction for how people evaluate (i.e.,
praise or blame) social behaviors.  Two studies investigated how people’s evaluations
differ for intentions in actions, bare (yet unfulfilled) intentions, and intentionally
performed actions.  The studies also show asymmetries between blame and praise (for
both intentions and actions), adding to documented negativity biases in person
perception.
To make sense of social interactions, people attend to, explain, and evaluate behavior.
They do so with a set of tools that has been called their “theory of mind” (Gopnik & Meltzoff,
1996; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990; see Moses & Chandler, 1992) or their “folk theory of
behavior” (Malle, 1997; Malle & Knobe, 1997a).  These tools constitute a conceptual framework
within which people think about human behavior—how it is produced and how it is related to
the mind.  In this framework we find the concepts of intentionality and observability (Malle &
Knobe, 1997b), distinct modes of explaining behavior (e.g., with reasons vs. causes; Buss, 1978;
Malle, 1998), and various mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions; see Astington, 1991;
Brand, 1984; D’Andrade, 1987).  In this paper we focus on two such tools—the concepts of
intention and of intentionality—and explore their implications for people’s evaluations, in the
form of praise and blame1, of other people’s behavior.
The literature has long recognized the strong impact of intentionality on praise and blame.
Ever since Aristotle (1892/330 BC), scholars have described what we shall call the
“intensification effect” of intentionality:  If people perceive an action as intentional, their praise
or blame for it is intensified compared to when they see that same action as accidental (Heider,
1958; Piaget, 1932; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994; Shaver, 1985;
                                                
1  The term blame has at least two meanings.  The first refers to the assigning of (causal) responsibility for
an outcome to a person (e.g., “People are too quick to blame their problems on others”).  The second refers to the
criticizing of a given intention or action (e.g., “I love you too much to blame you for going away”).  We are
concerned only with the second meaning, which takes to blame as synonymous with to reproach or to criticize.
Weiner, 1995).  In recent studies, for example, Hogue and Pebbles (1997) and Kleinke, Wallis,
and Stadler (1992) demonstrated that blame (as well as punishment recommendations) for rapists
were intensified when the alleged rapist admitted intent.
Even though prior research has recognized the importance of intentionality for judgments
of praise and blame, it has overlooked the difference between the construct of intention (a mental
state directed towards future action) and that of intentionality (the manner in which the action is
performed, namely, intentionally).  In Hogue and Pebbles’ (1997) study, for example, the
experimentally manipulated portrayals of the rapist confounded (a) the presence of a prior
intention (his initial intending to have sex) with (b) intentional performance (his continued
advance while being aware that the woman did not want to have sex).  Thus, it is impossible to
tell whether the intensification of blame and punishment was due to manipulated prior intention
or manipulated intentionality of performance.  Indeed, the authors labeled the manipulated
variable at times “intent,” at times “intentionality.”   Similarly, Shaver (1985), in his analysis of
blame and responsibility, equated a definition of intention with a definition of intentional action
(p. 121), and so did Shultz (1980; 1988) in his work on children’s theory of mind.  Only recently
have authors begun to distinguish intentions from intentionality (Astington, 1991; Meltzoff,
1995; Moses, 1993), often building on philosophical analyses (e.g., Anscombe, 1957; Bratman,
1987; Searle, 1983).  Below we clarify the folk  distinction between intention and intentionality
and explore its relevance for the study of people’s praise and blame.
Intention and Intentionality
One reason why the conceptual distinction between intention and intentionality has often
been overlooked is that psychology has been lacking a systematic and validated model of
people’s folk concept of intentionality.  Early attribution work contained merely researchers’
speculations about this folk concept (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; see also Maselli &
Altrocchi, 1969; Ossorio & Davis, 1968), and recent discussions have relied on speculative
models as well (Fiske, 1989; Fleming & Darley, 1989; Shaver, 1985).  Moreover, these models
have disagreed in what they identify as the necessary conditions for intentional action.  Malle and
Knobe (1997a) sought to resolve these disagreements by examining directly how people define
and use the concept of intentionality.  Their empirically derived model of this folk concept
shows that social perceivers distinguish between an agent’s intention and the agent’s performing
an action intentionally.  This distinction is based on at least three distinguishing features.
First, intentions and intentionality differ in the object to which they are ascribed.  People
treat intentions as mental states and therefore ascribe them to an agent.  Just as the claim that a
poem has the intention of arousing the reader really means that the poem’s author intended to
arouse the reader, the claim that an action has a particular intention means that the agent had this
intention.  By contrast, people ascribe intentionality to actions.  What they judge as intentional
(or unintentional) are concrete actions, already performed or in the process of being performed.2
Second, intentions and intentionality differ in their conditions of ascription. Whether
people ascribe an intention to an agent depends on the beliefs and desires they ascribe to that
agent—minimally, the agent’s desire for an outcome and his belief that the intended action will
lead to that outcome.  By contrast, people ascribe intentionality based on more stringent criteria
that include whether the agent had the intention to act that way, whether she had the skill to do
it, and whether she had awareness, at the time of acting, that so acting fulfills her intention (Malle
& Knobe, 1997a; Studies 3 and 4).
Third, ascriptions of intention and intentionality differ in their social function.  People
ascribe intentions to others, and express their own intentions, to describe or coordinate personal
and joint future action (e.g., Bratman, 1987; 1993).  Even linguistic evidence supports this close
link between intention and future action.  Having examined 70 different languages, Bybee,
Perkins, and Pagliuca (1994, ch. 7) concluded that all linguistic future forms have developed out
of forms that signal the speaker’s intention.  Intentions, then, clearly have a future-directed and
coordinating function.  By contrast, people ascribe intentionality in order to assess the meaning
and evaluate the social worth of a completed (past or present) action.
To summarize, in people’s folk theory of behavior, intentions are an agent’s mental states
directed towards future action whereas intentionality characterizes an action as based on an
intention and performed with skill and awareness.  This distinction leads to several interesting
and previously unexplored questions regarding people’s judgments of praise and blame.
Questions Examined in the Present Studies
First, what underlies the intensification effect of intentional action?  Is this effect merely
due to the presence (vs. absence) of an intention that matches the produced action or is it due to
the action’s intentionality (i.e., its performance with awareness and skill)?  We try to answer this
question in Study 1.
Second, given that evaluations of actions are susceptible to the intensification effect of
intentionality, are evaluations of intentions susceptible to this effect as well?  That is, are
intentions evaluated differently depending on whether their corresponding action is performed
intentionally vs. accidentally?  This question is also addressed in Study 1.
Third, is there a general difference between evaluations of a bare intention (an unfulfilled
plan) and evaluations of the action that carries out that intention?  That is, do people “discount”
(i.e., evaluate less extremely) bare intentions relative to their corresponding actions, as some
                                                
2  Lawyers and philosophers sometimes ascribe intentionality to an agent in the derivative sense of having
the abstract capacity to reason and to act intentionally (a sense that presupposes the ascription of intentionality to
actions).
religious and ethical systems suggest (e.g., Judaism or utilitarianism)?  We try to answer this
question in Study 2.
Fourth, are there asymmetries between praise and blame in any of the above patterns of
evaluation?  For example, does the intensification effect of intentionality hold more strongly for
blame than for praise?  Such evaluative asymmetries might parallel positive-negative asymmetries
that psychology has uncovered in other domains (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Malle &
Horowitz, 1995; Pratto & John, 1991; Taylor, 1991).  This question is addressed in both studies.
Study 1
In this study we examine what underlies the well-known effect that praise and blame are
intensified for intentional as compared to accidental actions.  This intensification could be due to
two factors: the mere presence of an intention or the action’s intentional performance.  According
to the first analysis, expressed in legal scholarship and the law (Duff, 1990; Hart, 1968; Kenny,
1973; Marshall, 1968), the critical difference between accidental and intentional action is the mere
presence of an intention in the intentional case.  An analysis of people’s folk concept of
intentionality, by contrast, suggests that an intentional action is not sufficiently defined by the
mere presence of an intention (Malle & Knobe, 1997a; cf. Mele & Moser, 1992).  Even though
the presence of an intention invites more blame or praise than the absence of an intention,
intention is only one of three necessary conditions that people use to ascribe intentionality, with
the other two being awareness and skill.  That is, an agent may have the intention to perform
action A but still accidentally perform A (without awareness or skill).  In this case people say
“She intended to A” but not “She intentionally A’ed.”3  According to people’s folk concept of
intentionality, then, the critical difference between accidental and intentional action is the
intentional performance of the action— i.e., the presence not only of an intention but also of skill
and awareness.
To distinguish these two analyses we shall call the first the legal account and the second
the folk-conceptual account.  Both accounts predict intensification of praise or blame when an
intention is present, compared to when an intention is absent.  For example, if an agent had the
intention to perform an action and then accidentally performs it, this should elicit more praise or
blame than if the agent did not have such an intention to perform the action and accidentally
performs it.  In this case, intentionality does not come into play (only intention does), so the two
accounts make the same predictions.  Similarly, for canonical intentional actions (in which
                                                
3  A famous philosophical example of an agent’s action with an intention but without awareness is
Chisholm’s (1966) murderer : He intends to kill his uncle in order to inherit his money but then accidentally runs
his uncle over with his car (because he did not see a man, who was his uncle, cross the street).  Examples of
accidentally acting with an intention but without skill abound in the amateur sports world:  A novice may intend to
hit a triple 20 in darts or a hole-in-one in golf or a three-pointer in basketball, but if the person does so, most would
say it was not intentional but due to luck (cf. O’Shaugnessy, 1980).  An empirical test of the darts case was
validated in Malle & Knobe (1997a), where people did not begin to ascribe intentionality to the novice who hits the
triple 20 unless he hit it twice in a row (thus demonstrating skill).
intention and intentionality co-occur), both accounts predict intensification—the legal account
because of the presence of an intention and the folk-conceptual account because of the presence
of intentionality.  However, there are situations in which the two accounts make differential
predictions.  One such situation is the comparison between (a) an agent who has an intention to
perform A and then intentionally performs A and (b) an agent who has an intention to perform A
and then accidentally performs A.  According to the legal account, only the presence of an
intention matters, so people should evaluate the two actions the same way as long as the agent’s
intentions are identical in each case, even though one action was performed accidentally and the
other one intentionally.  According to the folk-conceptual account, however, intentionality
matters over and above intention, so people should evaluate the accidental performance of the
action much less extremely than the intentional performance of that action, even though the
agents had identical intentions.
In addition to comparing the legal and the folk-conceptual accounts of the intensification
effect, we explore two further issues in Study 1.  For one, we examine whether the intensification
effect holds only for evaluations of an agent’s action or also for evaluations of the agent’s
intention.  If Malle and Knobe’s (1997a) model of the folk concept of intentionality is correct,
people distinguish sharply between intentions and actions.  Accordingly, praise and blame for
actions is susceptible to the distinction between intentional vs. accidental performance, whereas
praise and blame for intentions is independent of this performance distinction.  An alternative
hypothesis is that people’s pattern of evaluating intentions follows that of evaluating actions.
This could be because people do not see an intention as a separate mental state but rather as a
proxy for action (Anscombe, 1957, §4, §26; Ryle, 1949; Wittgenstein, 1953, §644, §659) or
because, even thought they distinguish between actions and intentions, they use the directly
observable actions as the basis for evaluating intentions.  Either way, evaluations of intentions
would be equivalent to evaluations of their corresponding actions, such that if an action is
intentional and its evaluation is intensified, the evaluation of its underlying intention would be
equally intensified.  We refer to this alternative view as the action-intention equivalence thesis.
The final issue to be explored in Study 1 concerns potential asymmetries between praise
and blame.  To this end we present two different vignettes in which the respective actions are
identical but the motivation for the agent’s intention is either benevolent (inviting praise) or
malevolent (inviting blame).  This way we can determine whether the intensification of
intentionality holds as strongly for praise as for blame.
To investigate these three issues, we devised a study that manipulated the valence of an
action as well as its accidental vs. intentional performance, and we assessed people’s evaluations
(praise or blame) for the agent’s intention to act as well as for the agent’s performing that action.
We held the content of the agent’s intention constant across all conditions and measured subjects’
perceived strength of the agent’s intention to control for its potential mediating influence.
Method
Participants.  In a mass-testing session of about 200 introductory psychology students,
170 completed the relevant one-page questionnaire (which was part of a larger packet of
unrelated questionnaires) and received partial credit towards their course requirement.  No
demographic data were collected, but comparable samples from the same student population have
had a median age of 18 and contained 65% females and 24% ethnic minorities.
Design. The main factors of the design were valence (positive or negative behavior
content), intentionality (accidental or intentional performance of action), and object of evaluation
(intention or action); only the latter was a within-subjects factor.  We counterbalanced the order
of questions asked: Some participants evaluated the agent’s intention immediately after reading
about it (before they read about the completed action) and evaluated the action afterwards,
whereas others evaluated both action and intention after they had read the entire story.  Within
the latter group, we also counterbalanced the order of rating the action and the intention; within
the former group, we counterbalanced whether people evaluated the action before or after rating
the strength of the initial intention.
Material.  The story [and its negative counterpart] described an “employee’s phone
call.”4  Joan Ellen Edmonds, the featured agent, is a clerk at a local company.  Her company hired
a new clerk, Jonathan Baite, and Edmonds appreciates him quite a bit [strongly dislikes him].
Edmonds heard that Baite loves to get phone calls [absolutely hates to get phone calls at home],
so she joyfully [gleefully] decides to give him an appreciation call the next morning when she gets
to work [a “wake-up call” next morning when she gets to work at 6 a.m.].  Pretesting showed that
blame ratings for the negative story were equal in extremity to praise ratings for the positive
story.
The next part of the story manipulated whether the action was performed accidentally or
intentionally.  When Edmonds arrives at her office the subsequent morning, she also remembers
that she wanted to call her mother.  She dials that number, but—in the intentional case—nobody
answers.  Then she calls Baite, who is delighted (extremely annoyed).  In the accidental case, she
dials that number, but—due to a central switchboard error—she ends up reaching Baite, who is
delighted (extremely annoyed).
All subjects were asked the manipulation check question, “Did Edmonds make this call to
Baite intentionally?”  In addition, all were asked (in varying order), “Does Edmonds deserve
blame or praise for calling Baite?”  Subjects checked a box for either blame or praise and filled in
the corresponding word into an empty space embedded in the following two critical questions:
“How much             [blame/praise] does she deserve for calling Baite?” and “How much                
[blame/praise] does she deserve for initially intending to call Baite?” (both 0-7 scales, labeled “a
                                                
4   After this study was conducted we discovered that Mele (1992, p. 151, n. 2) had discussed a similar
thought experiment.
littleÓ between the digits 1 and 2 and Òa lotÓ between the digits 6 and 7).  In addition, all subjects
were asked ÒHow strong was EdmondsÕ initial intention to call Baite?Ó (0-10 scale, labeled Òvery
weakÓ between the digits 0 and 2 and Òvery strongÓ between the digits 8 and 10).
Results
Ninety-four percent of subjects passed the manipulation check.  Out of 83 in the
intentional condition, 80 (96%) rated the behavior as intentional; out of 87 in the accidental
condition, 79 (91%) rated the behavior as not intentional.  There were no differences in the
passing rate either between the positive and negative story or between order conditions.  Those
11 subjects who failed the manipulation check were excluded, and 11 more subjects had
incomplete data.  Analyses were performed on the remaining 148 subjects. No reliable order
effects were found, and the results show three noteworthy patterns.
First, in their evaluations of actions (Figure 1), people sharply distinguished between
accidental performance (M = 2.0) and intentional performance (M = 4.8), yielding an effect size of
d = 1.48 (95% CI: 1.18 to 1.78)5; F(1,146) = 81.9, p < .001.  People made this distinction even
though the identical intention was present in both conditions and their ratings of strength of
intention did not differ (F < 1).  This result runs counter to the predictions of the legal account
and supports the folk-conceptual account: People intensify blame or praise when a behavior is
performed intentionally (rather than accidentally), even if the appropriate intention is present in
both cases.
Insert Figure 1 here
Second, people’s evaluations of the agent’s intention (Figure 1) were identical whether
that intention was fulfilled by an intentionally performed action (M = 4.8) or by an accidentally
performed action (M = 4.8).  This result contradicts the action-intention equivalence thesis and
supports the claim that people distinguish between intention and action in their judgments of
praise and blame.
Third, the power of intentionality to intensify evaluations of actions appears to be greater
for the blaming of negative actions than for the praising of positive actions (Figure 2).  Blame for
an action performed intentionally (M = 5.7) was intensified by a factor of 3.8 over blame for the
same action performed accidentally (M = 1.5), whereas praise for an action performed
intentionally (M = 4.1) was intensified only by a factor of 1.6 over praise for the same action
performed accidentally (M = 2.5), F(1, 144) = 19.3, p < .0001. In other words, the effect size for
                                                
5   We report a sample-based estimate of effect size d, computed as 
M1 - M2
MSe
, where MSe is the error term




blame intensification was d = 2.32 (95% CI: 1.91 to 2.73), whereas the effect size for praise
intensification was d = 0.88 (95% CI: 0.48 to 1.28).  Controlling for the rated strength of
intentions did not alter these results.
We replicated these findings in another sample of 94 undergraduate students.  Within
intentions, there was again no effect of intentionality (F < 1).  Within actions, however, we
replicated the intensifying effect of intentionality, F(1,90) = 30.9, p < .0001, d = 1.12 (95% CI:
0.84 to 1.4).  This intensifying effect was larger for negative actions (d = 1.5) than for positive
actions (d = 0.8), even though the corresponding interaction term did not reach the traditional
significance level (p = .11).6
Discussion
The present findings suggest that people use a refined folk theory of behavior in their
assignments of praise and blame.  They distinguish between an agent’s intention to do something
and the intentionality of doing it; they distinguish between evaluations of intentions and
evaluations of actions; and they intensify blame more than praise as a function of intentionality.
We discuss each of these findings in turn.
To test whether people evaluate actions using intentionality information over and above
intention information, we held the influence of intention constant.  For one, we used the identical
intention content (“to call Baite”) in the accidental and intentional condition.  This was also the
content of the corresponding action, so the agent performed either intentionally or accidentally
the very action that she had intended to perform.  In addition, we measured the perceived
strength of intention and found no difference between the accidental and the intentional condition.
Consequently, the differential evaluation of the accidental vs. intentional case must have been due
to the presence or absence of intentionality—specifically, to the component of intentionality that
we manipulated: awareness (Malle & Knobe, 1997a).  This component refers to the agent’s
awareness that she is fulfilling her intention with this particular action (cf. Searle, 1983), which
provides the “right link” between intention and action required for intentionality.  In sum,
information about intentionality (above and beyond intention) can substantially alter people’s
evaluations of action, favoring the folk-conceptual over the legal account.  The distinction
between intention and intentionality (Malle & Knobe, 1997a) is therefore not only of conceptual
interest but has direct implications for how people assign praise and blame to human action.
Second, we have seen that people evaluate intentions differently from actions (as the folk-
conceptual account predicts) in that only evaluations of actions are susceptible to the intentional-
accidental distinction.  This distinction applies strictly to the performance of an action, not to the
                                                
6  Effect sizes were smaller in this replication sample, probably because we unwisely used bipolar scales
(–5 to –1 for blame and +1 to +5 for praise) with a neutral point at 0.  In particular, the presence of a noncommittal
neutral point (chosen by 35% of subjects in their action evaluations) may have dampened the effects.
intention of performing it.  Despite this difference between evaluations of actions and intentions,
the two are closely related because they are based on the same content (e.g., the intention to call
and the action of calling) and on the same motivating reasons (e.g., to annoy Baite in the positive
case and to delight Baite in the negative cases).  Our study further suggests that these two
factors—intention/action content and motivating reasons—are independent determinants of
praise and blame.  Even though the content of the two intentions was held constant (to call
Baite), people evaluated them differentially because one was based on a positive motive (to
delight Baite) and the other was based on a negative motive (to annoy Baite).  Of course,
intentions can differ directly in content and be either blameworthy (e.g., Penny intends to steal
money from her father’s cash register) or praiseworthy (e.g., John intends to help a neighbor fix
his roof).  But even in these cases the agent’s motivation for the intention will influence people’s
evaluations (consider that Penny intends to steal money so that she can leave her abusive father).
How exactly people “compute” praise and blame on the basis of all these parameters—intention
content, motivating reasons, and in the case of action, accidental vs. intentional performance—has
not been analyzed systematically and is worthy of future research.
Third, we found an asymmetry between people’s use of intentionality for praising vs.
blaming an action.  This asymmetry held even when we controlled for the perceived strength of
intention.  Apparently, when people evaluate a negative action, they somehow take
intentionality more into account than when they evaluate a positive action.  That is, for negative
actions they are particularly sensitive to the manner in which the action is performed.  This
tendency would explain why people assign more blame to negative acts than omissions (equated
for intention and outcome) but assign equal praise to positive acts and omissions (Spranca,
Minsk, & Baron, 1991).  Omissions typically lack actions’ sharp boundaries (onset, offset, and
bodily movement), creating some doubt about the agent’s awareness and full intentional
“performance” of the omission (cf. Kordes-de Vaal, 1996).  If perceivers are more sensitive to
these features of intentionality in the case of negative actions, they would be inclined to discount
their blame for negative omissions but not necessarily their praise for positive omissions, as the
literature suggests.
Why might people have a heightened sensitivity to the agent’s manner of performing
negative actions?  Two important processes may operate in parallel, one on the intrapersonal
level, the other on the cultural level.  On the intrapersonal level, the costs of mistaking an
intentional negative action as accidental are high (e.g., one is vulnerable to a surprise attack);
similarly, the costs of falsely blaming an accidental negative action as if it were intentional are
high as well (e.g.,  one would be seen as unjust).  As a result, people need to distinguish carefully
between intentional and accidental negative actions.  By contrast, the costs of mistaking an
intentional positive action as accidental are low (one can still consume the positive outcome), and
the costs of falsely praising an accidental positive action as if it were intentional are also low, so
people can afford to be somewhat sloppy in distinguishing the two.  On the cultural level (at
least in Western cultures, broadly conceived), the distinction between intentional and accidental
negative actions has been continually reinforced.  One of the earliest documentations of the
intentional-accidental distinction refers to negative actions, namely, the Old Testament’s
distinction between intentional murder and accidental killing (Telushkin, 1994, ch. 58; see Kenny,
1973).  The concept of intentionality entered the English law in the 12th century when religious
concepts of free will and sin, influential in the Roman Law and Canon law, led to differentiations
of punishment—e.g., more punishment for freely chosen crimes (Marshall, 1968).  Religion and
the law, then, have taught people how to differentiate blame depending on intentionality, but few
cultural institutions teach people how to differentiate praise depending on intentionality.  One of
the few historic institutions of praise, the “ars laudandi” in Renaissance Rome, had orators speak
of God’s and humans’ laudable deeds without emphasizing their (assumed) intentionality
(O’Malley, 1979).  The same holds true for modern equivalents such as Nobel prizes, Olympic
Games, and Oscars, where successes are assumed to be intentional and never discounted as
“luck” (cf. the “hot hand” phenomenon, Tversky & Gilovich, 1989).
Study 2
In the first study and its replication, people praised or blamed intentions about as
strongly as their corresponding (intentionally performed) actions.  This may have been because
the vignettes portrayed the respective intentions as having a high degree of commitment: Each
intention was based on clearly formulated motives; the agent was described as actively deciding
to carry it out; and the intention was in fact fulfilled.  In real life, intentions are more often
described (or expressed) with less than full commitment, without mention of their motives, and
without indications yet of being carried out (e.g., “She plans to come next summer”; “I’ll return
your papers next week”).  Some authors have labeled such yet unfulfilled prior intentions “bare
intentions” (e.g., Anscombe, 1957; Kenny, 1973).  Study 2 tests the hypothesis that people
assign less extreme blame or praise to bare intentions than to their fulfilling actions.  Such a
phenomenon of “discounting” intentions may occur for at least two reasons.
First, bare intentions are usually removed in time from the intended action and are subject
to psychological and situational uncertainties (e.g., change of heart, emergence of obstacles).
Hence they are indicators with an imperfect predictive relationship to their fulfilling actions, and
imperfect indicators are likely to be discounted relative to their criterion.
Second, when bare intentions are formed in interpersonal contexts, they differ in social
meaning and relevance from actions.  Intentions are merely symbolic actions.  As plans for future
action they rarely have (physical) consequences. They can have powerful psychological
consequences (e.g. by inducing another person to prevent the plan), but to have those
psychological consequences, intentions must be believed.  This belief comes in various degrees,
leaving room for discounting in the case of weak belief.  Actions, by contrast, do not require
belief; they speak through their tangible physical and psychological consequences.  Thus, bare
intentions may on average be discounted (i.e., evaluated less extremely) relative to their
corresponding actions.
In addition to this general discounting pattern, there may also be an asymmetry of
discounting between blame and praise. That is, people’s blame for negative intentions may show
less discounting than does their praise for positive intentions.  Such an asymmetry may be due to
three processes.  First, because of the deviance and infrequency of negative actions, social
perceivers may consider negative intentions as predictively more diagnostic of their
corresponding  (fulfilling) actions than they consider positive intentions as diagnostic of their
corresponding actions.  As a result, people will be more skeptical about positive intentions and
limit their praise for them (as they do, for example, for New-Years resolutions).  Second, negative
intentions may be seen as more diagnostic of the agent’s underlying negative character than
positive intentions are seen as diagnostic of the agent’s underlying positive character (cf. Jones &
Davis, 1965; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).  As a result, blame for
positive intentions would be magnified because it is based on the agent’s inferred negative
character above and beyond the agent’s manifest intention.  Third, people may be strategically
biased towards attending to and blaming negative intentions more than towards attending to and
praising positive intentions because they try to avoid the high costs of overlooking negative
intentions that later are fulfilled and see few costs in overlooking positive intentions.
In sum, our second study explores (a) the general discounting effect of bare intentions
relative to completed actions across a variety of behaviors and (b) a possible asymmetry in
people’s blame and praise for bare intentions: that they may, on average, discount negative
intentions less than positive intentions.
Method
In order to select balanced stimulus behaviors that had similar characteristics within the
negative and the positive range, we conducted a pretest.
Pretest.  We first constructed 44 behavior contents, some taken from Fuhrman,
Bodenhausen, and Lichtenstein (1989), others invented by friends and colleagues. Each behavior
content was formulated both as an intention (e.g., “[Name] intends to help a neighbor fix his
roof”) and as an action  (“[Name] helped a neighbor fix his roof”).  Undergraduate students (N =
87) rated either all 44 action formulations or all 44 intention formulations for one (and only one)
control variable (e.g., desirability of action, length of action, frequency of intention, out-of-the-
ordinariness of intention; see Table 1).  Thus the pretest material consisted of a total of 11 forms,
one for each control variable, and 7 to 9 subjects completed each form.  We computed reliabilities
among raters within each control variable and excluded seriously unreliable raters.  (The
reliabilities along with number of raters, before and after any exclusions, are summarized in Table
1.)  Then we calculated the 11 control variable scores (aggregated across reliable raters) for each of
the 44 behavior contents to proceed with the selection of appropriate test items.
Insert Table 1 here
Selecting Test Statements.  We rank-ordered the 44 pretested behavior statements from the
most negative to the most positive (as defined by the action desirability score), with all control
scale ratings tabulated for each statement.  Then we selected pairs of behaviors from either end
(one positive, one negative) that were matched for the extremity of their desirability score (e.g.,
–3.6 and +3.6).  When more than one (positive or negative) behavior had such a matching score
(e.g., two behaviors with -3.6 desirability) and thus competed for selection, we used the
competing behaviors’ control scale scores as a decision criterion.  Some of the control scales
showed asymmetries between positive and negative behaviors as a group.  (For example, positive
behaviors had a higher score on length and frequency, whereas negative behaviors had a higher
score on out-of-the-ordinariness and difficulty.)  Each time we found competing behaviors, we
discarded the one that contributed more strongly to the asymmetries.  As a result, we usually
retained the behavior that was most similar to the matched positive behavior.  This way, we were
able to weaken or eliminate some of the control scale asymmetries while selecting positive and
negative behaviors that were as closely matched as possible.  Continuing this selection procedure,
we arrived at a matched set of 12 negative and 12 positive statements.  These 24 distinct
statements were formulated (a) as 24 completed actions and (b) as 24 intentions, making at total
of 48 statements.  The 24 intentions were identical to the actions except that each action phrase,
“[Name] [past tense verb] [behavior content],” was reformulated into an intention phrase,
“[Name] [intends to] [verb] [behavior content].”
Creating Test Forms.  In order to minimize demand characteristics we wanted to present
each participant with either the action formulation or the intention formulation of a given
behavior content (e.g., making vs. intending to make a prank phone call), but not both.  At the
same time, we wanted each participant to rate all 24 distinct behavior contents.  We therefore
created forms containing 24 distinct statements, half of which were the intention formulations of
12 behavior contents and half of which were action formulations of the remaining 12 behavior
contents.  From these “base” forms we created “yoked” forms that were identical to the base
forms except that the 12 intention statements were transformed into their corresponding action
statements and the 12 action statements were transformed into their corresponding intention
statements.
In order to maintain participants’ attention and to facilitate the incidental memory task
(remembering “whether each behavior was completed or intended”), we presented the 24
statements contained in each form in two trials of 12 statements each (with a 30-second break
between trials).  Within each trial, we selected twelve individual statements with the following
characteristics: (a) Six of them were intentions; six were actions. (b) Three of the actions were
positive, and the other three were negative with matched extremity; likewise, three of the
intentions were positive, and the other three were negative with matched extremity.  This created
a total of four “triplets.” (c) Each of these triplets was composed of statements that together
represented the broad range of desirability—that is, each triplet comprised one statement from
the most extreme terzile of desirability, one statement from the intermediate terzile of
desirability, and one statement from the least extreme terzile of desirability (e.g., one positive-
action triplet comprised the first, fifth-, and ninth-most positive action).7
As a result of this procedure, each form contained all 24 distinct statements, but 12 of
them were formulated as actions and the other 12 as intentions.  To create each yoked form, we
simply reformulated all intentions in the base form as actions and all actions as intentions, while
leaving everything else identical.  In this way we created a total of eight base forms (differing in
the choice of triplets from the desirability range) plus eight yoked ones, for a total of 16 forms.
Within each form, the first randomized trial of 12 statements was paired up with a list of 12
names (6 female, 6 male), and the second trial was paired up with a list of 12 different names.
The order of these names was mostly held constant across forms, with slight modifications to
ensure that each statement was paired up with a female name about as frequently as with a male
name.
Subjects and Procedure.  Subjects were 78 undergraduate students (60% female) enrolled
in an introductory psychology course.  Their ethnic composition was 74% White, 18% Asian
American, 6% Hispanic, and 1% African American.  All but six were native English speakers.
Subjects were run in groups of 8-12.  Each subject received a packet that introduced, after
instructions, the first set of 12 behavior statements (allowing them 2 minutes to memorize
whether a behavior was described as intended or performed), then asked people to rate each
statement on a blame-praise scale (ranging from -5 to +5), and finally tested people’s memory for
whether each behavior had been described as intended or performed.  After a 30-second break,
subjects went through the same steps with the second set of 12 behavior contents.
Results
We first inspected the rating distributions for each of the 24 behavior contents to identify
outliers.  We defined outlier data points as extreme ratings (4 or 5) with a valence opposite to the
                                                
7  This procedure is best illustrated by describing the steps for one particular form, namely, Form 1.  We
began with the selection of 12 statements for the first trial.  We first selected a triplet of positive actions from the
12 positive action statements (rank-ordered by desirability and labeled PA-1 to PA-12) by choosing one statement
from each terzile (PA-1 from the first terzile, PA-5 from the second terzile, and PA-9 from the third terzile).  Next,
we found the extremity-matched negative actions (NA-1, NA-5, NA-9), increasing the selection to 6.  Then we
selected a triplet of positive intentions from the 12 positive intention statements (rank-ordered by desirability and
labeled PI-1 to PI-12) by selecting one statement from each terzile (PI-2 from the first terzile, PI-6 from the second
terzile, and PI-10 from the third terzile).  Finally, we found the matched negative intentions (NI-2, NI-6, NI-10),
increasing the total selection to 12.  (Note that the selected intention statements are different in content from the
selected action statements.)  We then randomized the order of presentation for these 12 statements.  Then we turned
to the second trial for which we selected those statements that were not already selected in the first trial: PA-3, PA-
7, PA-11, NA-3, NA-7, NA-11, and PI-4, PI-8, PI-12, NI-4, NI-8, NI-12.  We also randomized the order of
presentation for these 12 statements.
rest of the sample (and to the pretest data), such as a +5 praise for “sold cocaine to his teenage
cousin.”  The 1872 data points contained 21 (1%) such outliers.  One subject contributed seven
of them, another four, and both subjects’ entire data were excluded from subsequent analyses.
The remaining 10 outlier points were distributed across 9 different subjects and 7 different
behaviors and were probably the result of accidental mismarkings or idiosyncratic construals of
particular behaviors.  These 10 data points (but not the subjects’ entire data) were excluded from
analyses.
People’s accuracy of remembering whether a given behavior was intended or performed
was better than 95% (23/24 correct on average).  Accuracy was slightly greater for actions
(96.5%) than intentions (94%), F(1,75) = 3.92, p = .05.  There was also a modest interaction
such that negative intentions and positive actions yielded greater accuracy than negative actions
and positive intentions, F(1,75) = 3.54, p = .06.
The two hypotheses—discounted evaluations of intentions relative to actions and greater
discounting for positive intentions than for negative intentions—were tested in several ways, the
first one with subjects as units of analysis.  Each subject contributed four scores: praise/blame for
the average of (a) six negative actions, (b) six negative intentions, (c) six positive actions, and (d)
six positive intentions.  These scores were entered into a 2 (positive vs. negative valence) ´  2
(intention vs. action) ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors and N = 76 replications
per cell.  The negative signs of blame scores were removed at this point so that the analysis
would pick up extremity differences between positive and negative evaluations rather than trivial
valence differences.  Overall, evaluations of intentions (M = 2.4) were discounted relative to
actions (M = 2.8), d = 0.48 (95% CI: 0.29 to 0.67), yielding F(1,75) = 24.7, p < .001.  In addition,
when we examined discounted blame for negative intentions (M = 2.6) relative to negative actions
(M = 2.9), the effect size was d = 0.36 (95% CI: 0.17 to 0.55).  By contrast, when we examined
discounted praise for positive intentions (M = 2.1) relative to positive actions (M = 2.8), the
effect size was more than twice as large, d = 0.84 (95% CI: 0.65 to 1.03).  The corresponding
interaction yielded F(1,75) = 7.7, p < .01.  Using subjects’ memory accuracy as covariates in this
analysis left all effects unaltered.
This analysis was repeated with stricter scoring procedures as well.  Only those
behaviors were included in individual subjects’ scores that had substantial ratings of blame or
praise within the entire sample ( ³  2.0, with 0 as the neutral point and 5.0 as the most extreme
rating possible), yielding scores based on 10 clearly positive and 10 clearly negative behaviors
(out of 24 total).  Evaluations of intentions (M = 2.7) were discounted relative to actions (M =
3.3), d = 0.60 (95% CI: 0.38 to 0.82), F(1,75) = 26.0, p < .001.  In addition, the discounting
effect size for blame was d = 0.40 (95% CI: 0.18 to 0.62),whereas the discounting effect size for
praise was twice as large at d = 0.80 (95% CI: 0.58 to 1.02).  The corresponding interaction
yielded (1,75) = 7.3, p < .01.
Insert Table 2 here
Next we used individual behavior contents (Nb = 24) as units of analysis.  Table 2
displays each behavior content’s action score and intention score, averaged across 35 to 39
subjects. To test our hypotheses we conducted a 2 (positive, negative) ´  2 (intention, action)
ANOVA on these highly aggregated scores.  Overall, intentions (M = 2.4) were discounted
relative to actions (M = 2.8), d = 1.28 (95% CI: 1.13 to 1.43), F(1,22) = 19.5, p < .001.  In
addition, there was more than twice as much praise discounting among the positive behavior
contents (d = 1.82, 95% CI: 1.67 to 1.97) than there was blame discounting among the negative
behavior contents (d = 0.74, 95% CI: 0.59 to 0.89). The corresponding interaction yielded
F(1,22) = 3.45, p < .08.  This effect of valence was similar when we restricted the comparison to
the 10 strictly positive behavior contents (d = 2.21) and the 10 strictly negative behavior
contents (d = 1.02).
We also inspected the pretest control measures to determine whether any of them
substantially reduced (and thus explained) the two discounting effects.  However, none of these
measures (except, of course, social desirability) had correlations with the discounting scores, and
none of them altered the above hypothesis tests when entered as covariates into the ANOVA.
Finally, to demonstrate that the blame-praise asymmetry is due to differences in the
discounting of intentions rather than to base rate variations in the evaluation of actions, an
ANCOVA analyzed the behavior contents’ intention scores as a function of (a) action scores and
(b) the dichotomous valence factor representing negative vs. positive behavior contents.  This
analysis equates positive and negative behavior contents for their extremity in action scores and
tests a difference in their intention scores strictly due to valence.  This latter difference emerged
strongly at d = 1.0, F(1,21) = 5.3, p < .05.
Discussion
Study 2 examined how people’s evaluations of bare (yet unfulfilled) intentions differ from
evaluations of completed actions.  The results support the hypothesis that people generally
discount their praise and blame of intentions relative to their corresponding actions.  The results
also support the hypothesis that people discount praise for positive intentions more than they
discount blame for negative intentions.
How generalizable are these discounting effects?  We consider three aspects of
generalizability.  First, in Study 2 we examined a large number of behavior contents that varied on
many dimensions (see list of control variables, Table 1).  Across these behaviors we found
consistent evidence for a general discounting of intentions and for greater discounting of positive
than negative intentions. In addition, we replicated these findings in another study with 36
distinct behavior contents, ranging from extremely kind to extremely unkind, as normed by
Fuhrman et al. (1989).  A total of 127 subjects rated sets of either 9 or 18 such behaviors, in the
same procedure as described above, and the results were essentially the same.  (For details, see
<http://www.uoregon.edu/~bfmalle/36beh.html>.)  We therefore believe that the results
generalize well to a variety of behavior contents.
Second, the results of this study generalize only to bare intentions, not to intentions that
immediately precede or coincide with their corresponding actions (see Study 1).  We expect that a
variant of Study 2 that presented intentions in action (e.g., “[name] tried to [behavior content]”)
would decrease the general discounting effect.  Similarly, highlighting the agent’s commitment to
the intention—e.g., as we did in Study 1, by complementing the intention statements with well-
defined descriptions of the agent’s motives and labeling that intention a “decision” to do
something—should decrease people’s discounting.
Third, 65% of subjects showed a consistent intention-discounting effect, and 65%
showed the blame-praise asymmetry in discounting (there was no correlation, however, between
showing one or the other effect).  It seems plausible that individual differences moderate both
effects.  People may differ in their moral rules and ideologies (Forsythe, 1981), such that some
people make a sharper distinction between intentions and actions than others.  For example,
Christian doctrines consider mere thoughts about sinful behavior already sinful (most radically
expressed by middle-age scholar Peter Abelard, see Kenny, 1973), whereas Judaic teachings focus
more on action and outcomes than on intention and motivation (e.g., Blank, 1991, ch. 4; Talmud,
1985, 23A+B).  Another potentially relevant variable is the social perceiver’s level of
interpersonal trust vs. suspicion (Kramer, 1994; Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996), which
may influence her confidence in agents’ general inclination to carry out their intentions, especially
their negative ones.
How can we explain the present findings?  Because none of the control variables
accounted for the discounting effects in our data, several explanations for the effects are ruled out,
such as those that rely on incidental features of the specific intentions or actions themselves (e.g.
difficulty, commonness, extremity of desirability).  Below we consider explanations, first, of the
general discounting effect and, second, of the praise-blame asymmetry.
An account of the general discounting of intentions must start with people’s folk concept
of intentionality, which posits that an intention is the agent’s mental state directed towards
future action and is a necessary but insufficient condition for the performance of an intentional
action (Malle & Knobe, 1997a).  Two facts follow from this concept:  First, because they are
mental states, intentions have less palpable consequences than actions do and proved fewer
opportunities for evaluation than actions do.  Second, intentions predict actions only
imperfectly, so people will tend to be conservative in their evaluations until they see whether the
action really occurs or not.  This predictive relationship between intentions and actions is
imperfect because for an intention to be carried out, several things must fall into place.  For one,
the intention has to persist, which usually implies that its motivating reasons (desires and beliefs)
must persist.  But desires change and new information emerges, which can sometimes alter an
agent’s intention.  Furthermore, for an intention to be carried out,  several enabling factors need to
be present (e.g., the agent’s skill, an opportunity) and inhibitory factors need to be absent or
overcome (e.g., interference from other people or physical obstacles).
To account for the asymmetry in the discounting of positive vs. negative intentions, we
now consider the three explanations introduced earlier and evaluate them in light of the results.
The first explanation relies on negative intentions’ greater predictive diagnosticity for
negative actions—i.e., their greater likelihood of being turned into action.  If people assumed such
greater diagnosticity of negative than of positive intentions, they would be justified in
discounting positive intentions more than negative intentions.  However, our pretests showed
that people consider negative intentions significantly less likely to be fulfilled than positive
intentions (see Table 1)—perhaps because they believe that the world generally works against
the fulfillment of negative intentions.  Thus, the present data do not support the predictive
diagnosticity explanation.
The second explanation posits that negative intentions are seen as more diagnostic of the
agent’s underlying negative character than positive intentions are seen as diagnostic of the agent’s
underlying positive character.  A similar explanation has been used to account for a negativity
effect in impression formation according to which people are more prone to infer negative traits
from negative actions than positive traits from positive actions (Jones & Davis, 1965; Reeder &
Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).  However, our pretests do not support this
explanation either.  One of the control questions was, “How likely is it that the person has
intended to perform this behavior before?”  If people drew stronger character inferences from
negative than positive intentions, they should be more inclined to assume that the agent has
intended this behavior before; but the difference between the 12 negative and the 12 positive
behaviors was negligible on this control question, and the means went into the opposite direction
(see Table 1).
The third explanation assumes that people have a strategic bias towards greater
responsiveness to negative intentions.  This explanation is best described in a signal-detection
framework.  The “detection” problem is this: If person P expresses an intention to perform
action A, should you “respond” to P’s intention?  Responding may include paying attention,
taking the intention seriously, expressing praise/blame, expecting that P will in fact perform A
and thus changing your own behavior in light of P’s anticipated action.  Because you either
respond or not and the action either occurs or not, there are four cases to distinguish.  Let a “hit”
be that you respond and the action occurs; a “correct rejection” that you do not respond and the
action does not occur; a “false alarm” that you respond but the action does not occur; and a
“miss” that you do not respond but the action does occur (see Figure 3).  The decision to
respond or not derives from the benefits of hits minus the costs of false alarms and the costs of
misses minus the benefits of correct rejections.  We believe that for positive intentions false
alarms are more costly than misses, whereas for negative intentions misses are more costly than
false alarms, suggesting a bias towards responding more strongly to negative intentions than to
positive intentions.  The reasoning goes like this:
If you ignore P’s negative intention and it ends up being carried out (a miss) you risk both
the negative action (e.g., a surprise attack) and the possible regret that you did not try to prevent
it (e.g., through blame or counteraction).  If you respond to P’s negative intention and it ends up
not being carried out (false alarm) you feel relieved because the action did not occur and perhaps
proud because your response may have helped prevent P’s action.  By contrast, if you ignore P’s
positive intention and it ends up being carried out (a miss), you can enjoy the positive action
(e.g., a surprise gift).  If you respond to P’s positive intention and it ends up not being carried
out (false alarm) you feel disappointed (e.g., because of a broken promise).  Thus, people may
pay close attention to negative intentions, readily blame them, and initiate preventive measures
because it would be costly not to, in case the intention leads to action.  (If recall accuracy is an
indication of attention, then people’s greater recall accuracy for negative intentions in Study 2
supports the notion that they pay more attention to negative than to positive intentions.)  By
contrast, people may be more reluctant to pay close attention to positive intentions, praise them,
or rely on them, because it would be costly to do so and then see the intention not carried out.
This strategic bias probably develops in direct social interactions, but it may well transfer to
mere observations of others’ intentions (which was the situation our subjects were in).
Our data are consistent with this signal-detection analysis, but future research must
provide more direct tests, such as by manipulating the costs of misses and false alarms.
Summary and Conclusions
Previous explorations of the folk concept of intentionality (Malle & Knobe, 1997a) led to
the claim that people distinguish between an agent’s intention and the intentionality of an action.
The present studies examined the implications of this distinction for people’s praise and blame of
both actions and intentions.
Before we summarize our findings we should emphasize that both studies focused on
praise and blame from a non-interacting observer perspective.  This is a common perspective
from which people judge social behavior—e.g., as citizens on jury duty, consumers of media
coverage, or perceivers of other’s interactions.  However, people also blame or praise the
intentions and actions directed at them, and the present findings do not necessarily generalize to
such cases.  We are convinced that the same conceptual distinctions hold in those cases (e.g.,
between intention and intentionality) and expect the effects we found for observers to be even
stronger for interactants because the costs of, say, overlooking negative intentional actions or
missing a negative intention now have direct implications for the interactant’s own welfare.  In
addition, the interactant’s emotions, goals, and personality may influence patterns of praise and
blame in systematic ways.  We hope that future research will examine these regularities of praise
and blame for others’ intentions and actions directed at oneself.
Now to a summary of our results.  Study 1 and its replication demonstrated that what
intensifies praise and blame for intentional (vs. accidental) action is the intentional performance
of the action, not merely the presence of an intention.  This finding supports the folk-conceptual
account of the intensification effect and speaks against the legal account of this effect.  Moreover,
such intensification of praise and blame holds only when people evaluate an action, whereas
evaluations of an intention appear to be independent of the manner in which the corresponding
action is performed.  This finding again supports the folk-conceptual model and speaks against
the action-intention equivalence thesis.  Study 2 asked people to evaluate bare (as yet unfulfilled)
intentions in contrast with completed actions.  We found that bare intentions were evaluated less
extremely, hence discounted, relative to their corresponding actions.  This discounting pattern can
be explained by the more palpable consequences of actions compared to intentions and by the
imperfect predictive relationship between intentions and actions, which encourages people to be
conservative in their evaluations until they see whether the action really occurs or not.
Both studies also demonstrated asymmetries between praise and blame.  For one, the
intensified evaluation of intentional (vs. accidental) action held more strongly for the blaming of
negative action.  We speculated that two processes may underlie this asymmetry: On the
intrapersonal level, mistaking negative intentional actions as accidental and falsely blaming
negative accidental actions as if they were intentional are more costly than the corresponding
errors for positive actions.  On the cultural level, intentionality has historically been more closely
linked to blame than to praise, and judgments of intentionality have been primarily used to
differentiate degrees of blame, not praise (Marshall, 1968; Kenny, 1973).  As this link between
intentionality and blame has established itself in modern cultural institutions, people may have
been socialized towards greater sensitivity to the intentional-accidental difference when blaming
negative actions than when praising positive actions.
A second praise-blame asymmetry emerged in the evaluative discounting of bare
intentions relative to actions: People discounted negative intentions less than positive intentions.
This effect is best explained by the strategic bias social perceivers have towards “detecting”
negative intentions, which is mainly due to the greater costs of ignoring negative intentions in case
they turn into action.
In acknowledging people’s folk concept of intentionality and especially the distinction
between intention and intentionality, the present studies point to novel regularities in people’s
praise and blame for social behavior.  We hope to have shown that careful attention to people’s
own folk concepts of behavior offers valuable insight into the complexities of social perception
and interaction.
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Table 1
Control Variables, Their Reliabilities (Assessed for 44 Behavior Statements in Study 2’s Pretest), and Their Average Scores for the 12
Positive and 12 Negative Behaviors Selected for Study 2
  a    (N) a  after excluding 12 positive 12 negative
Control Variable Questions unreliable judges  behaviors  behaviors
For Action Formulations:
How socially good or bad is this behavior? 0.97 (8) 2.3 -2.3
How long does it take to perform this behavior? 0.96 (7) 2.4 2.2
How out-of-the-ordinary is this behavior? 0.89 (8) 3.8 4.6
How frequently do people perform this behavior? 0.83 (8)       0.86 (7) 4.0 3.8
How likely is it that the person has performed this behavior before? 0.87 (9)       0.89 (8) 4.6 4.8
For Intention Formulations:
How socially good or bad is this intention? 0.97 (8) 1.9 -2.3
How difficult is it to fulfill this intention? 0.91 (9) 3.4 4.1
How out-of-the-ordinary is this intention? 0.89 (7) 3.3 4.8*
How frequently do people form this intention? 0.80 (7)       0.82 (6) 3.5 3.0
How likely is it that the person has intended to perform this behavior before? 0.72 (8)       0.77 (7) 4.2 3.8
How likely is it that the person will NOT fulfill this intention? 0.34 (8)       0.76 (4) 2.8 4.9**
Note:  * p < .05, ** p < .001 for comparing absolute control variable scores between the 12 negative and 12 positive behaviors
Table 2
24 Behavior Contents and Their Corresponding Action Scores and Intention Scores, Ordered by
Valence of Action Scores, in Study 2.
    M       SD         M        SD
Behavior content    act      act      intend   intend
sold cocaine to his teenage cousin -4.44     1.12      -4.33     1.10
started a false rumor about a work colleague’s criminal past -4.00     1.08      -3.62     1.32
disowned her son after he told her he was gay -3.92     1.59      -2.97     1.80
stole $50 out of her dad’s wallet -3.87     1.53      -3.65     1.40
built a highly explosive plastic bomb -3.54     1.95      -3.72     1.43
ripped off her brother when buying a joint present for their parents -3.32     1.60      -2.87     1.73
ate all the food before anyone else could have any -2.92     1.46      -2.33     1.03
parked her car illegally on a handicapped spot in front of a store -2.87     1.61      -2.70     1.33
harassed her neighbor’s dog -2.69     1.45      -2.24     1.34
made a prank phone call -2.32     1.56      -1.77     1.39
spent all summer on a golf ranch without his wife and children -0.87     2.43      -0.97     2.44
went swimming outdoors in 30 degree weather -0.16     2.08      -0.41     1.39
bought a coffee mug with her initials on it  0.59     1.45       0.78     1.40
bought an expensive new heating system for her house  0.81     1.47       0.41     1.16
explained national budgetary policy to a colleague  2.05     1.78       1.08     1.13
replaced three lightbulbs in her parents’ house  2.33     1.49       2.00     1.31
loaned her computer to a colleague  2.54     1.52       2.68     1.63
put money in the meter for an unknown driver  2.97     1.61       2.58     1.54
bought food for everyone in the office  3.23     1.39       2.84     1.36
called a distant uncle on his birthday  3.32     1.36       2.23     1.49
sowed a silk blouse for her mother  3.51     1.35       3.05     1.45
let a homeless person spend a night in his apartment  3.76     1.53       1.61     1.44
participated in an effort to clean up a city park  3.79     1.20       2.89     1.61
paid a month’s rent for a family threatened to be evicted  4.49     0.98       3.05     1.83













Extremity of evaluation for intentions and actions















Blame and praise for actions only
depending on whether they were performed accidentally or intentionally








Signal-detection analysis of the consequences of responding or not responding to an intention.
